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September ~ 1973
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD {D., MONT.)
,
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Mr. President,
It is time for America to replace a policy of foreign landbased
military omnipresence with a policy of discerning internationalism.
The amendment I have offered will stimulate that process.
provisions are not complex.
(l)

In brief it will

require a reduction by 50% of the landbased military

personnel stationed on foreign soil over a three -year
{2)

Its

period~

provide that at least 25% of the total be accomplished in

each of the three years;
(3)

permit the Executive branch total discretion to determine

from which countries these reductions will be made.
The amendment simply recognizes that approximately 500,000
military personnel are presently stationed on foreign soil and seeks
to reduce this figure to approximately 250,000 by June 30, 1976.
The amendment would not affect or reduce the additional 100,000
military personnel afloat off foreign shores.

Thus, under the terms

of the amendment approximately 85 ,000 military personnel must be
returned to the United States by June 30, 1974.

The President

would have total discretion from which countries these 85,000
could be removed (i.e., Okinawa and Thailand could account for
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the entire 85,000 if the President chose to return these troops
'•.

horne).

Only foreign shore based military personnel would be

included in the computation for eligibility for reduction.
And lastly, the amendment remains neutral on the question of
demobilization of the personnel returned.

It is my belief that the

pressures to maintain a standing Army in peacetime through volunteers
will significantly shrink the overall size of the military force
levels.

In this respect this amendment would complement that

forecast and complement as well the unanimous action by the Senate
Armed Services Committee which recommends an overall force level
reduction of 156,000 by June 30, 1974.
The enactment of this amendment would be totally consistent
with the Nixon Doctrine of worldwide presence manifested by other
than land forces on foreign soil.
Action by the Congress is long overdue.

The United States

has stationed overseas more than 500,000 military personnel.

In

addition another 100,000 of milita ry pe rsonne l ar e afloat away from
our s hores.

Thus approximat e ly 30% of our military force is statione

beyond our homeland.

Not since the days of t he British Empire--

or probably more truly, the Roman Empire--have so many been required
to "maintain the peace" away from our shores .

Many of our Post

world war II military posture s and we apons procurements, and those

.·
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of the soviet Union as well, have been imitative or mirrored responses
to each other.

When one superpower develops a missile the other

responds in kind.
If only that policy of mirrored action were applied to th'
stationing of u.s. forces on foreign soil.
The Soviet Union has stationed outside the Soviet Union
approximately 345,000 military personnel; of this total 330,000 are
stationed in Eastern Europe.

It is presumed that many of these

Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe are there for other than an
external threat from the West.

But notwithstanding the comparatively

restrictive military overseas policy of the Soviet Union, the
United States is badly overextended abroad.

'.

The presence on foreign

soil of so many u.s. military presumes a policy that heavily favors
the military option.

In fact it is my belief that the commitment

and level of U.S. forces abroad has determined our policy rather
than our policy determining the level of U.S. forces abroad.
It is almost beyond belief to most Americans that our country
maintains over 2,000 bases and installations on foreign soil; that
the Defense Department employs directly or indirectly approximately
173,000 foreign nationals at these bases and the installations to
support these u.s. Forces abroad; that over 314,000 dependents are
stationed overseas with these military forces.

Disbelief turns to

dismay when announcements are made that bases and installations

I'·
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are to be closed in the United States and persons put out of work all
in the interest of economy.

Economy is a desirable goal but it should

I

'
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apply to expenditurts abroad as well as expenditures at home.

The

impoundment by this Administration of $12 billion for domestic
programs; the devaluation and other weakenings of the dollar over

:

'

the past two years approach 50%; all marshall attention to this
policy of shameful overseas waste.

It cannot be tolerated any longer.

The amendment now pending is directed worldwide and not
specifically at Europe.

The public debate over the years has

focused primarily on Europe because it is there that the largest
contingent of U.S. Forces is stationed.

But equally forceful

questions can be raised to the U.S. troops stationed in Thailand-now about 45,000; or in Okinawa--now about 40 ,000; or Korea--also
about 40,000; or Taiwan--about 8,000; or the Philippines--about
15,000; or even Bermuda where about 1,000 men defend our national
interests.

In fact, this amendment could be fully carried out during

the first two years of its operation by reductions entirely from
the areas I have mentioned, Thailand, Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan,
Philippines and Bermuda, without removing one soldier from the
European Theatre.
But since Europe has become the symbol and for the opponents of
any troop reduction, their strongest case , it should be useful to
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examine the premises and view the weaknesses of this--the strongest
case.

Let us look at the realities that faced this Nation in 1951

which precipitated the stationing of four divisions in Europe.

-

Let

us look at the premises upon which the Congress assented and the

I

I

representations that were made about the permanence of such a
commitment of manpower abroad.

Then let us look at Europe and the

U.S. today, 28 years after the War, 23 years after the initial
stationing of these divisions to NATO.
EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II
World war II left Western Europe in ruins.

The United States

moved swiftly with the most massive reconstruction effort ever
attempted with its Marshall Plan--an effort that has proven
successful beyond expectations.

The institutions of Europe,

political, economic as well as military, were in shambles.

With

these weakened conditions in Europe combined with the common
perception of the threat of the hordes from the East a strong
military presence in Western Europe to complement the economic
effort was rational.

But the North Atlantic Treaty, ratified in

1949, did not commit U.S. troops to the European continent.

In fact,

the Treaty itself made no commitment of U.S. ground troops to Europe.
It was not until 1951 that the decision was made to send four land

• >
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-6divisions to Europe and Congressional assent solicited to
this significant commitment of troops.
The history of proceedings before the Congress are very
revealing.
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time that there was nothing
magical about four divisions.

The level was selected based upon a

judgment of our resources and their availability.
same standard were to be applied today.

If only the

And why should it not be

applied?
But even more revealing is the exchange that Senator Hickenloeper had with Secretary Acheson when it was made clear that each
signatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally make its own
determination of its contribution of military equipment , manpower
and facilities.

In addition, Secretary Acheson envisioned the

return of troops subsequently sent if the situation got better.
But what conditions were envisioned in 195 1 that initially
warranted the troops to go to Euruope and what thorny questions
should be resolved for us to expect their return?

Senator Smith

of New Jersey sought this information from Gene ral Bradley in 1951
and General Bradley felt the making of a peace treaty with Germany
and the state of preparedness of the other nations of Europe as well
as the aggressive intentions of the East were the chief irritants

.I
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Well, Mr. President, I think the time has come when Congress
must recognize that in the words of General Eisenhower, something
is "cockeyed" about U.S. troops stationed abroad.

President

Eisenhower later recognized that change was justified.

He stated

in 1963 that one U.S. division would be sufficient to fulfill our
commitment to NATO.
It is evident from these indicia of engagement with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe that the tension that existed in the early
'50's has changed significantly.
It is time that the U.S. recognized the existence of its own
policy toward the East.

The policy of this government should be

consistent, not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in trade
md cultural exchange and confrontation in military matters.

There

should be but one barometer by which this government guides its
actions toward the East.
But we have many barometers that provide such different readings
for the same phenomenon.

This dual standard for rationalizing

our policies vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful
focus.

If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire

to open markets and develop a mutual interdependency of East and
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the
economic sphere as they have with increased cultural and educational

.·......
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-10exchanges.
decade.

It is a natural evolution of the events of the past

But in the military sphere--in the NATQ structure--what

remains is a stale rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations from
bygone years.
THE MBFR
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease

~n

u.s.

military presence should take place.
But the time is never right for such action.

Two years ago

the argument was the policy of detente was underway and that nothing
should be done that would disrupt the process, including the
U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by Chancellor
Brandt's "Ostpolitik."
Today we find ourselves in a new situation.

Success has been

achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; the
warsaw and Moscow treaties

h~ve

been concluded; the status of

Berlin has been regularized; through the exchanges of visits between
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnew a new and better climate
has been created which allows us to talk about the Cold War in terms
of the past.
Despite this movement, we are being told that this

~s

the

"worst possible time" in which to take any action on the question
of our forces in Europe.

The bargaining chip is back.

Negotiations

.,._ -:--·· -.--... - -r................. -:-.
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-11on mutual force reductions are to begin on October 30th of this
year.
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR nego•
tiations will be even more complicated and lengthy than the first
phase of SALT.

Most informed and optimistic speculations are that

the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps two to three years
might be a reduction of no more than 10-15% on the part of those
countries involved.
Indeed, since the preliminary talks--i.e., talks as to whether
there should be talks--were expected to take roughly five weeks
and took about five months, my skepticism has been increased rather
than diminished about MBFR.

I really doubt that the United States

can remain immobilized on the troops question for a minimum of two
and possibly even four to fiv& years.

So the argument to wait for

MBFR really is a postponement of significant action indefinitely.
UNILATERAL ACTION
The questions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they
were undertaken in a bilateral framework.

The positioning of

forces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to
the other because of different logistical requirements will
generate 19 different solutions equal to the number of participants
at the conference.

•

I

So the complexity of MBFR is magnified 19 times.

•'·

-12The wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty which left the question• '
of specific troop commitments in the NATO command to be decided
unilaterally by each country is abandoned in MBFR.

Unilateral

action on such a matter is the only practical method.

Any nation

entering into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only
agrees in those negotiations to what she determines unilaterally
she can do or must do in her own national interest.

No negotiation

with the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to reduce any
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines
that those troops are needed in the Eastern European countries for
other than protection against an external threat.

In like manner,

if the Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops on other
'.

frontiers, or if she desires to divert a greater proportion of her
resources to non-military interests, then the appropriate reductions
by the USSR will be made--but only then.
So unilateral action on our part to reduce U.S. troops in
Europe, while still maintaining our commitment with a more wisely
structured but significantly reduced level of troops could very
well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the
part of the Soviet Union.
history.

This is not unprecedented in recent

Unilateral and independent actions taken by the United

States and the Soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear tests in the

..
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atmosphere precipitated similar constructive independent responses
on each side which ultimately led to the nuclear test ban treaty.
So the arguments that unilateral action cannot lead to constructive
responses are unwarranted.
Unilateral action on the part of the United States might produce surprising and constructive results.

What people fail to

rBalize is that the Soviet Union, ever since World War II, has not
only been acting, but reacting, within its military establishment.
Much of the Soviet force was created at a time when the United States
had clear nuclear superiority.

Most informed observers, here and

in Western Europe, agree that the Soviet Union is considerably more
c0nservative and suspicious than the United States because of its
historical experiences and the character of its society.
Ye t no one seems willing to make allowances for the inertia
of this military conservatism in the USSR.

We forget that the

speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well as our political leaders,
regarding n eed for NATO strength and readiness are read in quite
a different light by the Soviet leadership than we intend.

It seems

a simple proposition, that they trust us no more than we trust
them, but we do not se e m to be able to absorb this view and
act upon it.
But even more significant is the European reaction to any
removal of U.S. troops f rom the continent.

It is an accepted

-14-
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axiom that the Europeans would follow suit and reduce their

' 'l

'.

conventional forces as well.

'

What is the threat, then, that requires so many

' .

u.s.

.

''

forces

'I

on the Continent?

If there is a truly perceived threat of a con-

ventional war from the East, would not our European allies who
'

'

are closer to the "threat" then respond by an accelerated commitment
of resources?

But no, they would relax as well, accept the detente

and devote more resources to non-military ventures.

Then why

should we, 3,000 miles away, assume such arrogance as to perceive
a greater threat to Europe than do the Europeans?
I think the question presumes a rational answer but there is
none.

It does highlight, however, the dominance of the military

posture in Europe by the United States.

Since the formation of

NATO, there has never been a Supreme Allied Commander who was not
an American.

U.S. perceptions of the threat are tolerated by the

Europeans and why not--the
the cost.

u.s.

is footing the greatest share of

Sinc e it is really our nuclear response that the

Europeans wish committed, their tolerance for our eccentricities-including the World War II conventional war contingency--is very
high.

-15It baffles me why a properly structured U.S. military force.,
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of one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions, in position to

:

.

move rapidly along the German frontier, would not be even greater
insurance against any form of pressure from the East.
It would be more realistic to the type of improbable attack

!

t

that might conceivably come from the East.

It would permit American

forces to be engaged from the beginning, thus allaying any fears on
the part of the Europeans that the United States would not be
,.

involved in the event of a quick thrust into Western Europe.
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN
Mr. President, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary
drain and balance-of-payments costs of our troops stationed overseas.

I have deliberately left this point to one side in considering

these questions because I believe the United States will bear the
necessary costs to fulfill its international obligations.
history will show that!

Our

But I believe it is clear that the United

States can fulfill its international obligations abroad with a
significant reduction of U.S. forces on foreign soil.
I believe a focus on this issue can be gained at last because
of the competition for resources at home.

But these resources

will be saved, not by trimming our sails on our international
obligations but by trimming the waste from years of inattention
to a rational international policy .

..

;; *

,..

-16The Senate is well aware that the overall costs of our
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commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of
$17 billion, including everything except strategic forces; that
the direct annual operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S.
forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately $4
billion, and with equipment, over $7 billion; that the net balance
of payments drain because of the

u.s.

forces in Europe is approxi-

•.;-

.''

mately $1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing
daily because of the United States' disadvantage because of
inflation, successive devaluations of the dollar and other
weakenings.
A return to rationality on the part of the United States and
its forces abroad would yield a very significant savings in
resources to the United States.

I have deliberately not addressed

myself to the issue of whether the troops that should be removed
from foreign soil should be demobilized.

It is my opinion that a

very sound international policy for the United States could be
implemented with a reduction of 50% of the approximately 500,000
troops stationed on foreign soil.
The return of approximately 250,000 military personnel would
reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing
international and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate
for demobilization.

I

''
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But I don't think that the question of

'

'

-17demobilization has to be directly addressed at this time since I
believe the pressures of obtaining a military armed force without ,.,
i
• '

the draft will to a great extent resolve the issue of

demobilization~'

1
I

l

CONCLUSION
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Mr. President, the time has come to set aside the rhetoric
of the Cold War used to justify a status quo of military involvement
around the world.

,,

The time has come to recognize action that is long overdue,
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinational
negotiations that could take a decade or longer to recommend less
than what is justified today.
It is time now to respond to the spirit of detente, to the
success of the Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of

•.I

Europe, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more
fully to the needs of our own people at home.
I urge the adoption of the amendment.
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.'
,•·

'

'

\.-

.. ',

··.

.,

y

EVENTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED
TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
).

\;if.......l \

-

Renewal of Franco-Soviet trade agreement. February 1973 •.

~.U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to establish an emergency communications

link (hot line). June 1963.

3 . Tripartite treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space, and under water.
~

October 1963.

Approval by President Kennedy of U.S. wheat sales to the
U.S.S.R. October 1963.

~-~

U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement of exchanges in the scientific, technical,

educational, cultural, and other fields.

February 1964. (

~)

I U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugoslavia and Poland. March 1964.
-1. Renewal of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement. April 1964.
~/

U.S. Romanian trade discussions.

J

U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular agreement. Signed June 1964. Ratified March 1967.

/~

May 1964·

French-Soviet trade agreement. September 1964.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in desalination of sea water.
November 1964 •

,.1

Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee approval of the
Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security.
January 1965.

I~

Franco-Soviet color

television agreement. March 1965.

/'/ Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic
energy. October 1965.
':,-

U. s.-U. S. S.R. consular convention. December 1965.

Italo-Soviet cultural agreement. February 1966.
;I !tala-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical cooperation agreement.
April 1966 . .
. \..
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Yugoslavia becomes full contracting party to GATT. April 1966.

t 'i

De Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. June 1966.

,:,1

Franco-Soviet scientific, technical, and economic agreement. June 1966.

l

j f Franco-Soviet space research agreement. June 1966.
.~~

Fiat-Soviet agreement for construction of a Fiat factory in Russia.
August 1966.

~

1
-

Renault and Peugeot agreements with the U.S.S.R. regarding cooperation

with Soviet motor industry. October 1966 •
.J r/

Kosygin' s visit to France. December 1966.

~~/Franco-Soviet consular agreement. December 1966.

_:, ,; Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commission. December 1966.
··' Establishment of Joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce. December 1966

:t

North Atlantic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing a willingness
to explore ways of developing cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and
the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966.

'i

Franco-Soviet atomic energy cooperation agreement. January 1967.

,_ ,J

Franco-Soviet trade agreement. January 196 7.

c' Kosygin visit to the United Kingdom. February 1967.
~:; Fanf ani

l:

visit to Moscow. May 1967.

Italo-Soviet agreement on cooperation in tourism. May 1967.

-;,: Italo-Soviet consular convention. May 1967.
",· Poland become s full contracting member of GATT. June 1967.
U.K.-U.S.S.R. establish London-Moscow teleprinter line. August 1967 •
. ' '1

Harmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion of mutual
and

balanced force reductions in Central Europe. December 1967.

· ( Announcement of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space research. January 1968.

;t
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J r Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the U.S.S.R. January 1968 •
., . U.K.-U.S.S.R. scientific and

,,

t~chnological

agreement. January 1968.

NATO declaration calling for discussions of mutual and balanced force
reductions. June 1968.
~;

•/ _·

Signature of the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968.
Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the State of Bavaria
and the U.S.S.R. September 1968. ·
U.K.-U.S.S.R. civil air agreement. December 1969.

.'/ v'

Franco-Soviet civil air a greement. De cember 1969.
Italo-Soviet long-term agreement on the supply of Soviet natural

<(

gas to Italy. December 1969.
Soviet-West German agreements on supply of Soviet natural gas to

f',

Wes t Ge rmany. February 1970.
Opening in Vienna of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on strategic arms

j

limitation (SALT). April 1970.
NATO declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions. May 1970.
Signing of non-aggression treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Soviet Union. August 1970.
.

I

President Pompidou's visit to the U.S.S.R. October 1970.
Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet political
cooperation. October 1970.
Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. December 1970.

;'\ /
,"

Creation of a new basis for SALT negotiations. May 1971.

...... ·

Ouster of hard-line East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht. May 1971.

'

.
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Resumption of SALT negotiations. July 1971.
Soviet-West German agreement to open consulates in Hamburg and Leningrad.

' ·t

' ' ~:.· t
~ .. \;

'

July 1971.
Signature of first part of quadripartite agreement on Berlin. September 1971.

·:·

,',"'/ Chancellor Brandt's visit to the U.S.S.R. September 1971.
{·• U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on exchanging information on
certain missile testing activities. September 1971.
~·'

U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on improving the "hot line" between Washi.ngton

and Moscow. September 1971.
<· ~

Secretary Brezhnev's visit to France. October 1971.
.

~

Franco-Soviet agreement on economic, technical and industrial cooperation.
October 1971.

t l Romania becomes a full contracting party to GATT. November 1971,
/

-· Soviet-West German civil air agreement.

··

1

November 1971.

t- Ratification by the West German parliament of the West German treaties
with the Soviet Union and Poland. May 1972.
President Nixon's visit to Moscow. May 1972.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in the exploration of outer
space. May 1972.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in solving problems of
the environment. May 1972.
I'

U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on joint efforts in the field of medical science
and public health. May 1972.

'/I

U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on expanded cooperation in science and technology
and the establishment of a joint commission for this purpose. May 1972,

.l
\
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U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation between the American and Soviet
navies to reduce the chances of dangerous incidents. May 1972.

··,

,#

Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972.
Signing of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin. June 1972.

.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. three-year agreement on the export of
·~

U.S. agricultural commodities (especially wheat and feed grains).
July 1972.
Settlement of U.S.S.R. lend-lease obligations. October 1972.

t ,.

•, 7 U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime agreement . October 1972 .

Signing of U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial treaty. October 1972.
1 '1

I

Quadripartite declaration supporting East and West German membership
in the United Nations. November

1972.

Signing of the basic treaty on relations between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. December 1972.
Opening of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions. January 1973.
Soviet-West German 10-year agreement on the development of economic,
industrial, and technical coope ration, and cultural and
educational exchanges. May 1973 .

.•
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~SESSION

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Referred to the Committee on - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a n d ordered to be printed.
Ordered to lie on the tabla and to bo printed.

AM1EN1D lVAJENT
Intended to be proposed by Mr. ---~NS F IE_L_D__________··-------------··---···
(lnHr< UUe ot bW below)

to.&xxxxxxxxxxx~n>biU

H.R. --~?8§. ___ _ , an Act t o au thor i ze appropriations during
the f is cal yea r 1974 fo r procurement of a i r c r aft , mi s sile s , naval
v es s e l s , t r ac ke d combat vehic l es , t o rped oes , and o t her weapons,
and r esea r ch, deve l opmen t , test a nd eva l uati on f or th e Armed Forces,
vivr>Orrrm g pxx x fine: xxx ;cmscNnrrev.fb'l lo'\Vii'i~~ a nd t o prescribe t he au thori ze d p e r sonne l st r e n~th for each accive du t y compone nt and of the
Se lec t ed Res erve of eac h r ese rve c omp one nt of t he Armed Forces,
and the mili t ary t raini ng stude nt loa ds , and for ot her purposes,

viz:

At the appropria t e place in the bill insert a new section

as follows:
Sec.

(a) The Secre t a r y of Defense shall take such

action as may be necessary t o reduce, by not less than 50 per
centum, the number of milit ary forces of t he United States assigned
to duty in forei gn countries on March 1, 1973.

Such reduction

shall be completed not l at er t han June 30, 1976; and not less than
one-fourt h of the t ot al r e duc t ion required to be made shall . completed prior t o J uly 1, 1974, and no t less than one-half of such
totnl r e duc t i on s ha ll be comple te d prior t o July 1, 1975.
(b) Notwi t hstanding any other provisi on of law, no funds may
be

e~)ended

on or af t er July 1, 1974, to support or maintain mi11-

tary forces of the

Un ~t ed

St ates assigned t o duty in foreign

count ries if t he number of such forces so assigned to such duty
on or after such da t e excee ds a number equal to the number of
~·

such forces assi gne d t o su ch dut y on March 1, 1973, reduced by
such number as nec ess a ry t o comply \>lith t h e provisions of subsection (a) of this section.
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(c) As used in this section, the term "military forces of
the United States" shall not include personnel assigned to
duty aboard naval vessels of the United States.
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